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Executive Summary 
The purpose of this research project is to evaluate the Dunbar Neighborhood 
Association’s ability of reducing crime for its residents.  In November of 2002, a resident 
of Dunbar Neighborhood in Lexington, Kentucky established the Dunbar Neighborhood 
Association (DNA) to counter the perceived growing amount of criminal activity in her 
community.  The DNA held monthly meetings and relayed information about perceived 
and known criminal activity to the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Police Department.  
The police in turn promised to provide a beat officer who could be contacted by the DNA 
Chairwoman when she became aware of potential future crimes.  The following study uses 
an interrupted time series (ITS) to measure the number of calls for service made from the 
Dunbar Neighborhood to the police department, from January 1999-November 2002 and 
May 2003-January 2006 as a way of measuring perceived crime.  Phone calls fell into two 
categories, proactive or reactive calls for service, and then into five subcategories (calls for 
violent, nonviolent, narcotic, suspicious, and follow-up activity).  Total calls for reactive 
and proactive service as well as arrests made from phone calls were also studied.  Results 
show that since the establishment of the DNA, reactive calls for service have reduced, 
proactive calls for service have increased, and the number of arrests made per call made 
has increased.  Regression models show an 80% correlation between the number of calls 
made and the number of arrests made in Dunbar.  Regression models also show little 
evidence to suggest that negative displacement effects have occurred.  Evidence is 
consistent in finding a clear causal relationship between creation of the DNA and change in 
crime; however, because few social variables were controlled for, this study cannot 
conclusively state a clear causal relationship exists.  
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this research project is to evaluate the Dunbar Neighborhood 
Association’s (DNA) ability of reducing crime for its residents. To determine if crime has 
been reduced because of the DNA, this study examines the how residents in the Dunbar 
Neighborhood have changed their phone calling habits to the police department and if 
arrests per call have changed.  Specifically the study focuses on change in what criminal 
activity was being reported, by phone, to the police department and how often those calls 
for service were made.  Finally, the study explores the possibility of displacement effects of 
crime by examining a nearby neighborhood’s same calling habits.  By analyzing these 
phone call statistics, the researcher hopes to determine if there is a clear causal relationship 
between establishment of the DNA and the amount of crime in Dunbar. 
Problem Statement and Background 
The First District of Lexington, where the Dunbar Neighborhood is located, is 
characterized by poverty and an active underground economy.  The average income for a 
full-time professional employee in Lexington is just above $34,000, while those living in 
the First District earn just above $10,000.i  Only 25% of people in the First District have a 
high school diploma or above.ii  The Dunbar Neighborhood consists of 185 housing units 
and on four different streets (Kenton, W. Fifth, Toner and Campbell streets) and two 
different courts (Harken and Sheila Court).  Housing units are primarily owned by residents 
and landlords who rent to interested tenants. Even though Dunbar is only a block away 
from Transylvania University, tenants are typically poor and uneducated.  
 In November of 2002 Dorothy Porter, a long time resident and homeowner of the 
area established the Dunbar Neighborhood Association (DNA).  The DNA was created 
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because Porter wanted to take action towards reducing crime, reducing drug use and 
beautifying the neighborhood.  Prior to the DNA’s establishment, Porter believed that 
citizens of Dunbar were knowledgeable about the criminal activity taking place, however, 
they were either afraid to call the police or thought that calling would not make a 
difference.iii  Because of this, Porter announced that a gathering of concerned Dunbar 
residents would meet monthly, beginning in November of 2002, to discuss ways of 
improving the neighborhood.  During the first meeting, the DNA established a relationship 
with the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Police Department (LFUCPD).  The police 
department became aware that a community effort to reduce crime was starting and 
promised to do two things.  First, the police department would prepare to respond to more 
calls.  Second, the police department would provide a beat officer to work proactively with 
the DNA against crime.  The beat officer could be contacted by Dorothy Porter regarding 
recurring problems or troublemakers in the neighborhood, which the officer could then 
address personally.  For example, if a neighbor was known to drink heavily every Friday 
night and become disorderly, the officer may talk to him earlier in the week to let him 
know that people would be anticipating unruly behavior and would call the police 
accordingly.  Since November 2002, the DNA has grown slightly but only sees limited 
participation at its monthly meetings.  Porter describes the DNA as a group with a handful 
of regular attendees and a place where other residents come for assistance.   
The DNA has focused its efforts on building a relationship with the police, 
informing landlords of the DNA’s existence, and trying to beautify the neighborhood.  
From November 2002 until January 2006, there have been three different beat officers, 
each of whom established positive a relationship with the DNA.  The DNA’s relationship 
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with the police has also been strengthened because other officers have communicated with 
Porter and other residents.  This ongoing communication between the police department 
and the DNA is aimed at unifying the understanding of all neighborhood criminal activity.  
 The second focus of the DNA has been to build a better relationship with those who 
are landlords of Dunbar properties.  According to Porter, in the past, landlords would rent 
to anybody as long as they were able to make a profit on the property.  This led to landlords 
accepting tenants who were prone to criminal activity.  When complaints were brought to 
the landlords of their tenants’ actions, the landlords would claim ignorance and rarely take 
substantial action.  Because of the DNA, landlords are pressured to be more responsible for 
their tenants’ actions by residents and the police. 
 The third component of the DNA is to beautify the neighborhood.  In November 
2002, according to Porter, residents were inclined to leave various articles of trash, old 
tires, or parked cars on their lawns.  This debris made Dunbar a less aesthetically pleasing 
neighborhood.  The DNA has since organized multiple clean-up days where residents clean 
and help each other clean their yards to beautify the neighborhood.  Porter is planning on 
planting flowers in her yard this spring and will encourage others to do then same.  She and 
the DNA believe a clean neighborhood will lead to less criminal activity. 
The researcher’s primary aim is to determine whether there is a clear causal 
relationship between establishment of the DNA and the amount of crime in Dunbar. The 
researcher also aims to determine if arrests made per calls has changed since the creation of 
the DNA and to determine if displacement of crime has happened as a side effect.  To 
achieve these aims, a proper measure of criminal activity must be used which can show 
both changes in both reactive and proactive methods of reducing crime.  This measure must 
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then be applied to the Dunbar Neighborhood, a control neighborhood, and a neighborhood 
that can measure the effects of possible displacement. 
Literature Review 
 Most major city or metropolitan police departments have some breakdown of crime 
statistics on their website.  Each department provides crime statistics in its own way, but 
there are many methods that overlap, such as listing annual violent crimes or traffic 
violations.  Some police departments, such as New York Cityiv and the City of Phoenix,v 
also include the number crimes for specific categories compared to the number of arrests 
that were made.  However, the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Police Department does 
not provide such a breakdown.  
There are other methods used in reporting crime.  In the United Kingdom, crime 
statistics are broken down into three categories: reporting a crime; recording a crime; and 
detecting a crime.vi  An independent organization in the UK goes a step further and 
conducts the yearly British Crime Survey, which actually interviews individuals about their 
victim experiences.vii  The US Department of Justice measures violent crime in three 
categories: Total violent crime; victimizations reported to the police; crimes reported to the 
police; and arrests for violent crime.viii  These examples show that people measure crime in 
different ways.  This realization is not surprising considering that crime levels are not an 
exact science.  Because no judicial system is perfect, it is impossible to assure that 
convictions or acquittals are all true.  Crime statistics cannot just be based exclusively off 
of arrests either, because not all arrests are of a guilty party and often, arrests are not 
always able to be made because a person may flee the scene.   
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This study uses the number of phone calls for service made to the LFUCPD as its 
data, because the aim is to determine if Dunbar Neighborhood residents have changed their 
reactive and proactive calling habits to the police since creation of the DNA.  This method 
is not without fault, because exclusively measuring phone calls does not include every 
attempt by citizens to contact police.  Citizens are able to obtain police assistance in a 
number of ways like flagging down a passing police cruiser or even using the internet to 
contact police.  For example, in Arlington, Virginia, the police department allows citizens 
to report crimes on its website.ix  Even in Lexington, Kentucky a resident can email the 
police if they have information regarding past homicides.x  Therefore, while this method is 
not an exact science, it is advantageous because it can indicate reactive and proactive 
efforts by the community and police to fighting crime.  Because the DNA specifically uses 
community policing, which has both a proactive and reactive element, studying phone calls 
will help to determine if there is a clear causal relationship between establishment of the 
DNA and crime levels.  
 In order to determine how best to fight crime, residents and police need to 
understand what breeds crime.  The three main reasons that crime exists in a neighborhood 
are because there of social disorganization, an opportunity to commit a crimexi; and an 
overall lack of care for properties.xii  The two components needed for significantly reducing 
neighborhood crime are community policing and sustained police partnerships.xiii  Success 
of these components, especially in poor and high crime areas, depends greatly on 
substantial and continued police assistance. When these components of community 
policing and police partnerships are implemented, environmental and enforcement efforts 
are then needed for reducing crime.  Environmental strategies are efforts aimed at 
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improving the physical appearance of the neighborhood, while enforcement strategies are 
community efforts to work with police, landlords, and store owners to help enforce laws 
and ordinances.xiv   
Community policing is a relatively new method for fighting crime.  While its 
origins go back to the mid 20th Century, it became a national effort in 1994 when federal 
legislation funded 100,000 police officers specifically for community policing.  Whereas, 
traditional police departments reactive to calls for service, community policing however, 
involves a proactive approach to solving crime.  Consisting of three parts, crime 
prevention, problem solving, and police partnerships, success of this method depends on 
constant trust and communication between the police and the community members.xv  An 
example of community policing is when a resident was constantly calling the police 
because of loud music coming from his neighbor’s stereo.  However, instead of continually 
ticketing the violator, the police suggested moving the stereo to another part of the house, 
allowing the violator to listen to low music in a part of the house that wouldn’t disturb his 
neighbor.  Community policing has become a national way of fighting crime.  At Eastern 
Kentucky University, the Kentucky Regional Community Policing Institute works to 
“encourage and enhance the implementation of community policing in Kentucky”xvi  which 
relies on constant citizen input to inform police departments of problems and potential 
problems in a neighborhood.  The City of Chicago has established the Chicago Alternative 
Policing Strategy (CAPS) which relies on partnerships between the police and community 
to reduce crime.  The Chicago Police Department website touts a number of achievements 
and strategic plans for fighting crime related to CAPS.xvii  North Carolina Wesleyan 
College Professor of Justice Studies Thomas O’Connor cites a list of over 200 community 
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policing programs on his class website.xviii  From coast to coast, cities are starting to 
implement community policing strategies. 
Though community policing is a national way of fighting crime, it has not always 
been proved reliable.  Research shows that any effort will succeed at some level, but 
individual program lasting success depends on circumstances particular to that 
neighborhood.xix  Past studies show policing and resident surveillance techniques on 
average will have some positive effect on reducing crime.   However, that effect drops to 
little/no effect when public sector housing neighborhood associations were examined.  The 
conclusion was that crime reduction only with citizens who are willing to establish a long 
term relationship with local police.xx  For those communities that do establish long term 
relationships with the police, it follows that police gain a connection to their community 
which results in increased job satisfaction.xxi   
 On the issue of displacement, the general conclusion is that it exists, but only in 
limited quantities and only in neighborhoods that are a short distance from where the 
treatment was applied.  In 1994, the Ministry of Justice in Holland contracted Professor 
Rene Hesseling to studying the phenomenon of displacement by reviewing all available 
literature with studied the various crime prevention measures where researchers had 
previously looked for evidence of displacement.  Over a year later, a review of 55 
published articles found little evidence that displacement of crime was a hard and fast 
occurrence.  There were 22 studies that found no displacement at all, and six of those 
actually helped reduced crime in surrounding areas.  There were 33 studies which found 
limited displacement, however no study found a total displacement of crime.  In 1999, three 
evaluations in England that assessed a new police scheme to fight crime concluded that 
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crime was not displaced to the neighbors.  The results led all three researchers to believe 
that the new scheme did not “displace crime to the neighbors.”xxii   
Displacement, if it happens is often “difficult to predict and often impossible to 
measure in all its form”xxiii because it depends on what “whether offenders resort to any 
combination of alternative targets, times, places, methods, and offenses and whether these 
alternatives are familiar to the offender.”xxiv  For example, “drug dealing has been found to 
be susceptible to displacement.”xxv  However, other than that displacement does not seem 
to happen in areas that require an offender to travel far.  “The most general and consistent 
finding is offenders do not appear to travel very far. xxvi   Studies have shown that the 
average distance traveled to commit a domestic burglary was 1.8 miles.xxvii
Method 
 The researcher’s aim is to determine whether there is a clear causal relationship 
between establishment of the DNA and the amount of crime in Dunbar.  Crime, in this 
study, is defined as any action which a neighborhood resident is witness to subsequently 
calls the police.  To determine the amount of crime, the researcher obtained a list of the 
number of calls from residents living in Dunbar to the Lexington Police Department over 
an 85 month period (January 1999 until January 2006).  The researcher then broke down 
calls into three main categories (reactive calls, proactive calls, and arrests) and eight 
subcategories (violent crimes, nonviolent crimes, narcotic crimes, suspicious activity, 
follow-up activity, total reactive and proactive calls for service, and arrests made as a result 
of calls made).  Reactive calls refer to those calls made for violent, nonviolent, and narcotic 
activity.  Proactive calls refer to those calls made for suspicious and follow-up activity.  For 
a complete list of what constitutes violent, nonviolent, narcotic, suspicious or follow-up 
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calls, reference Appendix A.  Arrests refer to calls made that resulted in an arrest.  Once 
data were classified and tallied on a month by month basis, the numbers were placed into a 
Microsoft Excel file and a Stata 9 computer system to determine the average amount of 
calls per category, per month for both before and after establishment of the DNA.  Also 
calculated were line of best fits for data both pre and post November 2002. 
This method, known as an interrupted time series, is a strong design and is only 
susceptible to internal validity threats of history or instrumentation, exactly at the time of 
treatment.xxviii  This design can be strengthened by also examining a control and a 
displacement neighborhood.  Therefore, the researcher obtained a list of the number of calls 
from a neighborhood located less than a mile away, called York (referred to in this study as 
“Displacement”), and a neighborhood located roughly five miles away, called Hedgewood 
(referred to in this study as “Control”).  Both neighborhoods, picked at random, have 
between 180 and 215 housing units and would be considered congested areas by an average 
onlooker.  By selecting Hedgewood as the Control, the researcher is able to focus on how 
the treatment of the DNA is specific to Dunbar and Lexington’s First District, and not to 
the rest of Lexington.  Because the goal of this study is to evaluate the DNA’s ability of 
reducing crime for its residents, the control did not need to possess similar economic or 
social demographics.  The treatment of the DNA is unique to Dunbar, and the literature 
review shows that a displacement will not travel five miles.  Therefore, because 
Hedgewood did not establish a crime prevention program at anytime during the months 
studied, and was also affected by all the same city wide changes, legislative and otherwise, 
it makes for a good Control.  The only criterion that was needed for selecting a 
displacement was that it was within 1.8 miles of Dunbar.  The selection of York as the 
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Displacement was random expect for its close proximity to Dunbar and location in the First 
District of Lexington.  The same criminal activity tallying method used for Dunbar was 
used on these two neighborhoods. 
There were multiple calculations made by the researcher.  There were 46 
observations prior to the treatment and 33 observations after.  The six month period of 
November 2002 through April 2003 was not calculated to allow for Dunbar residents to 
become accustomed to using the DNA.  This omission of these six months is very 
important in measuring how crime has changed.  Generally, people’s habits will not 
instantly conform to every new social situation.  Most people go through an emotional 
change curvexxix when experiencing a new situation.  A person’s attitude goes from denial, 
to resistance, to resentment, to exploration, to responsibility, and then finally to 
commitment.  In this example, the change curve that the researcher is concerned with is 
that of the residents.  Residents need to time to become habituated to the belief that 
proactively calling the police will help reduce crime.  This phase in period is essential to 
make this study accurate. 
After measuring 46 observations (for each of the three neighborhoods) prior to 
creation of the DNA and 33 observations post creation, the researcher compared the pre 
and post means of the each of the eight categories (violent, nonviolent, narcotic, suspicious, 
follow-up activity, reactive and proactive calls made, and arrests made from calls made).  If 
the post May 2003 mean fell outside of the 95% confidence interval of the pre November 
2002 numbers, then it was determined that calls for police service or number of arrests 
made had a experienced a statistically significant change. 
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A regression analysis was then run to determine how the number of arrests in each 
neighborhood was affected by the number of calls made to the police department.  By 
calculating these numbers, the researcher could determine if arrests per call had changed 
and how each type of call for service affected the number of arrests made.  For example, 
did calls for violent activity lead to more arrests than calls for nonviolent activity? 
Two regression analyses were also run to determine the effects of displacement.  
First the researcher ran a regression of how calls for service in Dunbar affected the number 
of arrests in the Displacement Neighborhood.  The purpose of running this regression was 
to determine if the number of arrests in the Displacement was negatively affected by the 
calls for service in Dunbar.  A fear is that an increase in calls for service in Dunbar would 
occupy more police resources, leading to fewer arrests that could be made.  Displacement 
was also measured by running a regression to determine if the number of calls for each 
specific category (violent, nonviolent,) in Dunbar was correlated with the number of calls 
made for that same category in the Displacement Neighborhood.  The purpose of running 
this regression was to determine if calls for perceived criminal activity in Dunbar had an 
affect on calls for perceived criminal activity in the Displacement.  Evidence that 
displacement existed would be aided if reactive crime calls declined in Dunbar and 
simultaneously increased in the Displacement.  A finding for positive effects of 
displacement would exist if proactive calls for service in Dunbar affected positively 
affected proactive calls for service in the Displacement.  Equations for these regressions are 
listed in the findings section of this paper. 
With the establishment of the DNA as an integral part of a community policing 
program, success is based on change in the amount and change in the type of resident 
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phone communication with the police department.  Success would be indicated by 
statistically significant decreases in reactive calls for service, increases in proactive calls 
for service, and increases in the number of arrests made from the number of calls made.  
Success is measured this way because a decrease in reactive calls for service would 
indicate that fewer new crimes are taking place, while increases in proactive calls for 
service indicate a more efforts to take preventative crime fighting measures.  Also, more 
arrests are being made relative to the number of calls being made, indicates that the police 
have been able to apprehend a suspect more efficiently than prior to November 2002.  
Findings – ITS 
 Through an interrupted time series design, the researcher found there to be many 
significant impacts across all three neighborhoods.  The Dunbar Neighborhood saw 
statistically significant changes in seven of eight areas (violent, narcotic, suspicious, 
follow-up activity, total reactive and total proactive calls for service, and arrests made from 
calls).1  The Control Neighborhood saw statistically significant changes in three of eight 
areas (calls for violent, nonviolent, activity and total reactive calls for service).  The 
Displacement Neighborhood saw statistically significant changes in four of eight areas 
(calls for violent, nonviolent, and narcotic activity and arrests made from calls).  A more 
detailed breakdown is listed in the chart below and graphs are presented in Appendix E. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 This was determined by taking the averages of each variable from January 1999 – November 2002 and 
comparing them with the average for May 2003 until January 2006.  If the latter average fell outside the 95% 
confidence interval of the former, then the finding was deemed statistically significant. 
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Averages for Criminal Activity Before and After November 2002   
 BEFORE   AFTER  95%
Dunbar Neighborhood no./mo 
Confidence 
Interval no./mo Difference significant
Violent 5.49 4.65 6.32 3.39 -2.1 x 
Nonviolent 10.04 8.45 11.63 8.55 -1.49   
Narcotic 0.98 0.5 1.45 2.36 1.38 x 
Suspicious Activity 1.98 1.32 2.63 5.18 3.2 x 
Follow-up Activity 1.89 1.24 2.54 5.21 3.32 x 
Reactive Total 16.5 14.41 18.59 14.3 2.2 x 
Proactive Total 3.87 2.86 4.88 10.39 6.52 x 
Arrests Made 1.39 1.01 1.78 4.15 2.76 x 
Control Neighborhood       
Violent 3.89 3.2 4.58 2.49 -1.4 x 
Nonviolent 8.7 7.41 9.98 4.58 -4.12 x 
Narcotic 0.35 0.06 0.64 0.27 -0.08   
Suspicious Activity 1.44 0.99 1.89 1.18 -0.26   
Follow-up Activity 1.22 0.85 1.58 1.3 0.08   
Reactive Total 12.93 11.19 14.68 7.33 5.6 x 
Proactive Total 2.65 2.05 3.25 2.48 -0.17   
Arrests Made 0.7 0.44 0.95 0.91 0.21   
Displacement Neighborhood       
Violent 4.91 4.18 5.65 3.46 1.45 x 
Nonviolent 10.48 9.15 11.81 12.21 1.73 x 
Narcotic 0.33 0.17 0.48 0.88 0.55 x 
Suspicious Activity 3.26 4.14 2.38 3.64 0.38   
Follow-up Activity 4.04 3.33 4.76 4.15 0.11   
Reactive Total 15.72 14.01 17.43 16.55 0.83   
Proactive Total 7.43 6.18 8.43 7.79 0.36   
Arrests Made 2.41 1.8 3.03 4.09 1.68 x 
 
 
 
Findings – Regression 
 A regression analysis was then run to determine how the number of arrests in each 
neighborhood was affected by the number of calls made to the police department.  The 
equation used was:  
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Y = b + B1V + B2W+ B3X + B4S + B5Z 
 
Where, when studying one neighborhood, Y is the number of arrests made from calls in a 
neighborhood, V is the number of calls for violent activity, W is the number of calls for 
nonviolent activity, X is the number of calls for narcotic activity, S is the number of calls 
for suspicious activity, Z is the number of calls for follow-up activity, B is the coefficient, 
and b is the intercept.  The regression determined that there was a significant correlation 
between the number of calls made and the number of arrests made in three of five 
categories for the Dunbar Neighborhood (calls for violent, suspicious, and follow-up 
activity).  Arrests in the Control Neighborhood had a statistically significant correlation to 
one of five categories (calls for follow-up activity).  The Displacement Neighborhood had a 
statistically significant correlation at the 95% level in one of five categories (calls for 
nonviolent activity) and a statistically significant correlation at the 90% level in another 
category (calls for follow-up activity).   These coefficients show how much a call from a 
particular category had on the likelihood of a subsequent arrest being made. 
 The researcher then determined how calls for service could explain the number of 
arrests by looking at the R-squared.  The R-squared, which shows how strong the 
regression model is, increased substantially in the Dunbar Neighborhood, from .36 pre 
November 2002, to .80 post May 2003.  This means that after May 2003 there is a 44% 
more likelihood that a call from the Dunbar Neighborhood will lead to an arrest.  Also, by 
looking at the coefficients, one can determine how the number of arrests made from calls 
was affected by calls for each category of service.  For example, there is a .44 coefficient 
for both calls for violent activity and calls for suspicious activity, and that means if one call 
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for violent activity was made and one call for suspicious activity was made in a given 
month, there would be .88 arrests made.  The R-squared for the Control Neighborhood 
increased from .08 -.28 and the Displacement Neighborhood’s R-squared increased .15 - 
.48 for the same time periods.  A complete chart of this model for each neighborhood and 
its coefficients is listed below. 
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# of Arrests as Affected by # of Calls     
Dunbar Arrests = B1Violent + B2Nonviolent + B3Narcotic + B4Suspicious 
+B5Follow-up 
 
1/99-
11/02 
5/03-
1/06 Difference
SE Post 
5/03 
z Post 
5/03 95% 
R-Squared 0.28 0.8 0.52    
Adjusted R-Squared 0.36 77 0.41    
Coefficient       
Violent 0.07 0.44 0.37 0.15 2.99 x 
Nonviolent 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 0.06 -0.45   
Narcotic -0.08 0.15 0.22 0.08 1.18   
Suspicious Activity 0.33 0.44 0.11 0.08 5.25 x 
Follow-up Activity -0.04 0.39 0.43 0.13 8.13 x 
intercept 0.26 -1.76 -2.02 0.94 -1.83   
       
Control Neighborhood      
 
1/99-
11/02 
5/03-
1/06 Difference
SE Post 
5/03 
z Post 
5/03 95% 
R-Squared 0.08 0.28 0.2    
Adjusted R-Squared -0.03 0.17 0.2    
Coefficient       
Violent -0.01 -0.4 0.03 0.12 -0.3   
Nonviolent -0.02 0.9 -0.11 0.08 1.16   
Narcotic 0.08 -0.06 -0.14 0.41 -0.14   
Suspicious Activity 0.03 -0.03 0.6 0.22 1.26   
Follow-up Activity 0.19 0.39 0.2 0.2 1.96 x 
intercept 0.55 0.1 -0.54 0.58 0.17   
       
Displacement 
Neighborhood       
 
1/99-
11/02 
5/03-
1/06 Difference
SE Post 
5/03 
z Post 
5/03 95% 
R-Squared 0.15 0.48 0.33    
Adjusted R-Squared 0.05 0.4 0.35    
Coefficient       
Violent 0.18 0.15 -0.03 0.2 0.75   
Nonviolent -0.01 0.18 0.19 0.08 2.48 x 
Narcotic 0.3 0.26 -0.04 0.44 0.58   
Suspicious Activity 0.14 0.11 -0.03 0.19 0.58   
Follow-up Activity 0.21 0.15 0.6 0.08 1.91   
intercept 0.26 0 -0.26 1.2 0   
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When measuring for displacement effects, the researcher ran a regression of how 
calls for service in Dunbar affected the number of arrests in the Displacement 
Neighborhood.  The equation used was: 
 
Y = b + B1G + B2H + B3CI + B4J + B5K + B6L 
 
Where Y is the number of arrests in the Displacement, G is the number of calls for violent 
activity in Dunbar, H is the number of nonviolent activity calls in Dunbar, I is the number 
of narcotic activity calls in Dunbar, J is the number of suspicious activity calls in Dunbar, 
K is the number of follow-up activity calls in Dunbar, L is the number of arrests in Dunbar, 
B is the coefficient, and b is the intercept.  There was no statistically significant correlation 
between the two.  A complete chart is listed below. 
 
Displacement Arrests as Affected by # of Dunbar Calls   
 
1/99-
11/02 
5/03-
1/06 Difference
SE Post 
5/03 
z Post 
5/03 95% 
R-Squared 0.2 0.15 -0.05    
Adjusted R-Squared 0.08 -0.01 -0.09    
Coefficient       
Violent -0.05 -0.1 -0.05 0.23 -0.31   
Nonviolent 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.09 0.24   
Narcotic -0.15 -0.17 -0.02 0.19 -0.64   
Suspicious Activity 0.47 0.28 -0.19 0.14 1.26   
Follow-up Activity -0.24 0.21 0.35 0.92 0.95   
Arrests -0.21 -0.26 -0.06 0.41 -0.65   
intercept 2.21 3.04 45 1.42 1.53   
 
Displacement was also measured by running a regression to determine if the 
number of calls for each specific category (violent, nonviolent,) in Dunbar was correlated 
with the number of calls made for that same category in the Displacement Neighborhood.  
For example: did the number of calls for violent activity in Dunbar affect the number of 
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calls for violent activity in the Displacement Neighborhood.  The researcher found that 
there was a positive statistically significant correlation between calls made for follow-up 
activity in Dunbar and calls made for follow-up activity in the Displacement 
Neighborhood.  An example of the equation used is: 
 
YV = b + B1M + B2cN + B3O + B4cP + B5Q 
 
Where YV is the number of displacement neighborhood calls for violent activity, M is the 
number of Dunbar calls for violent activity, N is the number of Dunbar calls for nonviolent 
activity, O is the number of Dunbar calls for narcotic activity, P is the number of Dunbar 
calls for suspicious activity, Q is the number of Dunbar calls for follow-up activity, B is the 
coefficient, and b is the constant.  This equation was then modified for each of the five 
categories of calls that are studied.  The only category that showed a statistically significant 
result was follow-up calls in Dunbar having a positive effect on the number of follow-up 
calls for the Displacement.  The results for follow-up activity are listed below and all charts 
are listed in Appendix B. 
Displacement Calls for Follow-up Activity as Affected by # of Dunbar Calls 
for Follow-up Activity 
 
1/99-
11/02 
5/03-
1/06 Difference
SE Post 
5/03 
z Post 
5/03 95%
R-Squared 0 0.18 0.18    
Adjusted R-Squared -0.02 0.16 0.18    
Coefficient       
Violent(Dunbar) 0.31 -0.18 -0.49 0.46 -0.38  
Nonviolent (Dunbar) -0.1 -0.17 -0.07 0.24 -0.71  
Narcotic (Dunbar) 0.06 0.03 -0.03 0.43 0.07  
Suspicious Activity (Dunbar) -0.24 0.06 0.3 0.35 0.17  
Follow-up (Dunbar) 1.87 0.21 -1.66 0.1 2.14 x 
Intercept 3.5 4.79 1.29 1.93 2.48  
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Trends in Calling Activity 
 
 The researcher examined the trendlines of calls made in each neighborhood and in 
each category from January 1999 – November 2002 and from May 2003 – January 2006.  
By looking at these lines, one can gain a better sense of criminal activity trends both before 
and after the treatment.  This information can then be used to help determine whether or not 
establishment of the DNA may have had any affect on community criminal activity as well 
as help determine how the Displacement Neighborhood was affected. 
 In examining trends before and after the treatment of the DNA, there is evidence of 
district wide social changes post May 2003.  The findings are listed below and 
interpretation of them is explained in the “Discussion” section.  In three of the eight 
categories studied, there were six changes in trendline slopes above 19% a month.  Those 
areas were Dunbar calls for nonviolent activity, Dunbar and Displacement calls for follow-
up activity, total number of reactive calls for service in Dunbar and the Displacement, and 
total number of proactive calls for service in Dunbar and the Displacement.  A chart is 
listed below: 
 
Monthly Trendline Slopes for Pre and Post Intervention    
# of Calls for 
Violent Activity 1/99-11/02 5/03-1/06 Difference  
# of Calls for 
Follow-up 
Activity 
1/99-
11/02 
5/03-
1/06 Difference
Dunbar -0.08 -0.02 0.06  Dunbar 0.04 0.31 0.27
Control -0.07 0.03 0.1  Control 0 -0.02 -0.02
Displacement 0.03 -0.04 -0.07  Displacement -0.03 0.22 0.25
         
# of Calls for 
Nonviolent 
Activity 1/99-11/02 5/03-1/06 Difference  
# of Total 
Reactive Calls 
Service 
1/99-
11/02 
5/03-
1/06 Difference
Dunbar 0.04 -0.29 -0.33  Dunbar 0 -0.23 -0.23
Control -0.14 -0.12 0.02  Control -0.21 -0.08 0.13
Displacement 0.13 0.04 -0.09  Displacement 0.18 -0.01  -.19
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# of Calls for 
Narcotic 
Activity 1/99-11/02 5/03-1/06 Difference  
# of Total 
Proactive Calls 
Service 
1/99-
11/02 
5/03-
1/06 Difference
Dunbar 0.06 0.08 0.02  Dunbar 0.14 0.41 0.27
Control -0.01 0.01 0.02  Control 0.04 -0.02 -0.06
Displacement 0 0 0  Displacement 0.09 0.29 0.2
         
# of Calls for 
Suspicious 
Activity 1/99-11/02 5/03-1/06 Difference  
# of Arrests 
Made From Calls 
for Service 
1/99-
11/02 
5/03-
1/06 Difference
Dunbar 0.09 0.1 0.01  Dunbar 0.01 0.18 0.17
Control 0.03 0 -0.03  Control 0.01 -0.02 0.03
Displacement 0.11 0.07 -0.04  Displacement 0.07 0.03 -0.04
 
 
This means that within one year, on average, there was at least a 2.28 change in the number 
of calls or arrests made as compared to pre November 2002 trends for the listed categories.  
For example calls, for nonviolent activity in Dunbar fell .33 per month.  This means that on 
average, there were 10.89 fewer calls in January 2006 than there were in May of 2003.  A 
visual depiction in graphs can be found in Appendix E. 
Weaknesses of the Study 
 There are six main weaknesses in this study 1) The study only measures criminal 
activity, not specifically crimes that were committed  2) This interrupted time series study 
was completed with less than the standard 100 observations  3) The LFUCPD changed its 
instrumentation of data gathering prior to the treatment 4) Duplicate calls are not controlled 
for 5) National standards for what constitutes violent, nonviolent, narcotic, suspicious, and 
follow-up activity were not used 6) A lack of complete data prevented some statistics from 
being entered 7) Other possible reasons for a changes in proactive and reactive calls were 
not controlled for. 
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 The primary goal of this study is to determine if the DNA has reduced crime, 
however this study does not specifically measure total crime.  Instead, perceived crime is 
used as the measurement.  As stated in the literature review and method sections, the 
measuring of perceived criminal activity does not incorporate every crime that has been 
committed.  Merely calling the police to report a crime does not account for all crimes that 
have been committed.  This is because the police can be contacted about crime from 
sources besides the phone.  Therefore, this study does not measure all crimes that have 
been committed and it is impossible to determine whether or not crime totals have fallen 
since November 2002.  Instead, it can only be determined how a neighborhood’s perception 
of crime, and subsequent reaction to it, has changed.  This is a major weakness because 
calls for service reporting criminal activity is not interchangeable with actual crime. 
 Second, this study only included 85 months of observation which is 15 short of the 
standard 100xxx that is generally accepted when conducting an interrupted time series.  An 
addition of 15 observations would have brought more statistical power to calculating 
averages prior to the treatment. 
 Third, the LFUCPD changed the way it kept records of phone calls in November of 
2001.  The data that the researcher received both prior and post November 2001 contained 
the same categories for recording data, however, data post November 2001 was more 
detailed in its description of why the call was made.  For example, post change, the charge 
“criminal mischief” was more often associated with a crime, such as property damage or 
disorderly.  This may mean that data were not completely entered before the change in 
instrumentation, which may have skewed the pre November 2002 results for the 
“suspicious activity” category. 
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 Duplicate calls were not controlled for in this study either.  Though uncommon, 
these calls do constitute a statistical problem which may have unfairly swayed results. 
 Another weakness lies in the arbitrary categorization of criminal activity.  These 
categories were decided upon by a novice researcher and there may have been errors in 
judgment as to what constitutes a particular crime.  For example, drunkenness was omitted 
as a crime because the researcher did not initially believe that public intoxication could be 
adequately quantified.  There are many people who have been publicly intoxicated, 
however, rarely do criminal implications follow.  Upon further reflection though, it may 
have been appropriate to add drunkenness to the nonviolent criminal activity list because it 
is a crime and a call for that crime was made by a concerned citizen.  The researcher 
temporarily forgot that his stated question was to measure the amount of criminal activity 
as determined by neighborhood residents, not true criminal activity.  Therefore the 
omission of drunkenness, along with wanton endangerment, counterfeiting, forgery, animal 
complaint, and others, could potentially have skewed data results, particularly when 
looking for a relationship between calls made and arrests from calls made. 
 The sixth major weakness of this study deals with how the LFUCPD recorded 
different criminal activity.  There were a number of phone calls for “assist other agency” 
which were not fully specified.  The assistance could have been given to help the fire 
department, or it could have been made to help a federal enforcement agency apprehend a 
suspect.  This ambiguity prevented addition of this type of call and unknown/unwanted 
person, and lost/found/damaged property from being included.  Also, post change in 
instrumentation, child abuse and child neglect were often listed as one call.  Rarely were 
 25
the two specified, forcing the researcher to assume child neglect instead of child abuse.  
Had the record been more specific, more accurate results would have been produced. 
 The final major weakness of this study is that other potential reasons for rises in 
proactive calls and declines in reactive calls were not controlled for.  The aim of the 
following study is to determine if perceived criminal activity has changed in Lexington, 
Kentucky’s First District, since the creation of a neighborhood association in November 
2002.  However, this study does not specifically link change in calling habits to the creation 
of the DNA.  There are many other possibilities as to why calling habits may have changed.  
Reactive calls for service could have decreased because the economy improved and less 
people wanted to commit crimes, or because criminals had moved out of their houses 
between November 2002 and May 2003.  Proactive calls could have risen because more 
proactive people had moved into the neighborhood, or because criminals allowed 
themselves to be more visible during and after committing a crime.  This study does not 
take any steps to control for these factors.    
Strengths of the Study 
 The three strengths of this study are 1) how calling habits have changed since 
creation of the DNA 2) how perceived criminal activity is categorized and 3) how criminal 
activity has changed in two other neighborhoods 4) that it debunks a 2004 public report 
claiming more significant decreases in calls for service. 
 This study is strong in its ability to show how many calls for services related to 
criminal activity have been made both prior to and post creation of the DNA.  The 
interrupted time series design is able to show, with certainty, what change has occurred 
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post May 2003.  While the interrupted time series did not have the recommended 100 
observations, it is still a strong study because change and trends are clearly measurable.   
 The second strength of this study is that is breaks down criminal activity in reactive 
and proactive categories.  By breaking down observed criminal activity into two broad 
categories, one can have more evidence to determine if a clear causal relationship between 
the DNA and crime exists.  It follows that when evaluating community policing tactics, 
changes in reactive calls should differ than changes in proactive calls.  Without these 
specific categories, the researcher and audience may have reached faulty conclusions.  
Also, categorization of the number of arrests made as a result of these calls indicates the 
relationship between Dunbar residents and the LFUCPD.  This is because the LFUCPD 
may have forewarned repeat offender, thanks to Dunbar residents who have provided 
earlier information. 
 The third strength of this study is that criminal activity is compared across three 
neighborhoods.  An ITS design is strengthened by adding multiple groups to the overall 
examination.  By studying three neighborhoods, the results of the study are strengthened 
because statistical information can be shown as being, or not being unique to the 
neighborhood which received the treatment.   
 Finally, this study improves upon a study conducted by the LFUCPD in 2004 that 
showed a decrease in the number of calls for service.  In that 2004 report, the author only 
tallied the total number of calls for service (which included calls for missing persons, 
assisting citizens, traffic violations…) which were not proved to be related to criminal 
activity.  The police and First District Councilman George Brown used this report to 
demonstrate the DNA’s effectiveness to the public, which some could argue was ethically 
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wrong.  This study is a more comprehensive examination of calls for service than what was 
previously available to the public. 
Discussion 
 Between November 2002 and January 2006, there were been a lot of change in 
Lexington.  This was shown by the many statistically significant changes that the ITS 
displayed.  This city wide change in crime habits can be accredited to any number of 
reasons not studied in this examination.   However, through the use of regression, it has 
become clear that in Dunbar, a significant majority of arrests were correlated with 
proactive measures.  The regression model which determines how the number of calls for 
service affected the number of arrests explains 80% of the correlation between the 
dependent and independent variables.  The same model from January 1999 until November 
2002 only explains 36% of the correlation.  This means that when crime related calls from 
Dunbar are made, there is a greater likelihood of an arrest being made.  Coefficients for 
proactive crime fighting measures increased substantially as well.  For suspicious and 
follow-up activity, the coefficients were .44 and .39 respectively.  This means that since the 
creation of the DNA, if one call was made for suspicious activity in May and one call was 
made for follow-up activity in May, there would be almost one (.83) arrest made in May, 
specifically due to proactive calling.  Also notable in the models is the substantial .37 
increase in the effect of calls for service due to witnessed violent activity.  The new 
coefficient, (.44) accounts for almost a half more arrests pre month since the DNA’s 
creation, when all other factors are held constant.  Simply put, more arrests are happening 
in Dunbar when calls for service to the police department are made. 
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 There was a substantial change in the amount of calls for service in the 
displacement and control neighborhoods as well.  Even though there were significant 
changes in calls for service, this study cannot conclusively determine why there was a 
change.  It appears that other variables are necessary to explain why the amount of calls for 
service changed at statistically significant rates across three different neighborhoods in 
Lexington.  It is not apparent, through this study, what those variables could be.   
Reactive calls for service can be explained in a number of ways.  The police force 
may have created a community outreach program in the past two to four years, resulting in 
a greater trust among all residents of Lexington.  The studied neighborhoods (other than 
Dunbar) could have established an unofficial watch program resulting in more proactive 
and reactive efforts to communicate with the LFUCPD.  It could also follow that there was 
a high turnover in the number of Dunbar residents prone to criminal activity, meaning all 
the criminals left Dunbar.  Whatever these factors are, there are simply not known.   
Proactive calls for service could have changed because of a number of reasons as 
well.  For example, during the six month phase in period, was there a high turnover of 
Dunbar residents who had historically not reported crimes for citizens who are more likely 
to call the LFUCPD when a crime is witnessed?  After May 2003, were more crimes made 
during the day, when making criminals more visible to residents?  If so, did this cause more 
people to call the police for suspicious activity or for follow-up activity?  Did the economy 
improve during the six month phase in period, causing more people to have greater assets 
and thus be more likely to take the proactive measure of calling the police when a 
suspected criminal was seen?    Was there an effort by members of the nearby Transylvania 
University to proactively fight crime near campus?  Was there a change in human 
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instrumentation at the police department where a person prone to misreporting data was 
switched with a person who was more accurate at fully reporting data?  Any of these 
possibilities could account for the data changing the way it did. 
 When studying for effects of displacement, the results were surprisingly positive.  
Through the regression models used, the only significant effect that number of calls in 
Dunbar had on the number of calls in the Displacement is a positive effect on follow-up 
calls made.  This means that when more calls for follow-up activity were made in Dunbar, 
more calls for follow-up activity were made in the Displacement.  The question remains 
though, why the increases in proactive calling?  Did the example of the DNA prompt the 
Displacement Neighborhood to change their proactive ways, or was it because of a totally 
unrelated variable?  Through this study, it just can’t be concluded.  However the data does 
give evidence to support the notion that the DNA has had a positive effect on displacement.  
 Regressions also show that the number of calls for criminal activity in Dunbar have 
no statistically significant effect on the number of arrests made in the Displacement.  This 
means that as the police were involved with calls in Dunbar, their ability to make arrests in 
the Displacement Neighborhood was not statistically changed.   
 By examining the trendlines in this study, a few questions about the effectiveness of 
the DNA are raised when examining Dunbar calls for violent activity, Dunbar calls for 
narcotic activity, and Dunbar calls for suspicious activity.  However, these negative 
questions are countered when looking at the Dunbar trendlines for nonviolent and follow-
up activity, total reactive and proactive calls for service, and number of arrests made from 
calls for service.   
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Trendlines tell us that calls for violent activity were already decreasing in Dunbar 
and Control areas prior to establishment of the DNA.  This, combined with a downward 
trend in number of violent calls for service in the Displacement (post May 2003), raises the 
question of the DNA’s true effect.  Did this reduction come from the DNA, or was it just a 
continuation from before?  An answer for this may lie partly in examination of the Control, 
which saw a change in slope direction post May 2003.  However, we cannot be sure simply 
by using this model. 
Trendlines of narcotic activity also raise a concern about the effectiveness of the 
DNA.  Post May 2003, Dunbar saw a continued increase in the number of calls for narcotic 
activity.  It is not clear what this means because there was only a .02 change in slope.  
These results may suggest that narcotic activity (which is usually less easily visible than 
violent and nonviolent activity) takes a longer time to find and report than other crimes.  
This may mean that the DNA is actually working, just slower with regards to narcotics.  
However, it could also mean that those involved in narcotic activity have not been deterred 
by the DNA’s establishment.  A further examination of this should be conducted. 
Finally, trendlines of calls for suspicious activity also seem to have been on the rise 
before the DNA’s establishment.  Post May 2003, there was only a .017 adjustment in 
slope for this trend and only a slight change in intercept.  This evidence suggests that with 
or without the DNA’s creation, the neighborhood was becoming more active about calling 
the police.  However, a possible counterpoint to this question may be in the examination of 
both the Control and Displacement Neighborhoods.  Prior to November 2002, all three 
neighborhoods saw a positive slope in calls for suspicious activity, however, Dunbar had 
the only positive slope difference when looking at calls made post May 2003.  This 
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comparison is evidence that Dunbar had become more proactive at stopping crime 
compared to the Control and the Displacement.  However, why they became proactive 
cannot be conclusively determined. 
The trendlines for nonviolent activity are the most dramatic example of change post 
May 2003.  The Dunbar neighborhood had 1/3 less calls per month than it had prior to 
November 2002.  In comparison, this dwarfs the 1/10 less calls for nonviolent activity per 
month for the Displacement neighborhood and the 9/400 increase seen at the Control.  
There was clearly a social change post May 2003.  What is responsible for this social 
change cannot be conclusively determined here. 
An examination of follow-up activity trendlines also shows a significant change in 
slope for both the Dunbar and Displacement Neighborhoods post May 2003.  Both saw 
dramatic increased (.27 and .25 respectively) while the Control saw a slight decline (.02).  
This is evidence of the proactive steps taken by the both neighborhoods to prevent crime by 
turning in repeat offenders.  The fact that nearly identical dramatic increases happened in 
both Dunbar and the Displacement raise more questions.  Was there another social variable 
particular to the first District that caused such a change, or did the example of the DNA 
have a positive effect on those in the Displacement?  Further research needs to be 
conducted to determine the answer. 
The trendlines for both total reactive and proactive calls for service also show 
substantial changes in Dunbar and Displacement neighborhoods.  Two neighborhoods 
respectively saw .23 and .19 decreases in total reactive calls for month.  These numbers are 
impressive, however, they are made more so by a .13 slope increase seen at the Control.  So 
as calls for nonviolent activity in Dunbar and the Displacement are falling, calls for 
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nonviolent activity in the Control are rising.  Again, this finding shows evidence that a 
significant social change occurred in the First District, a change felt greater in Dunbar and 
at the Displacement.  Similarly, there was an increase in Dunbar and the Displacement in 
total proactive calls with a .27 and .20 increase respectively.  Further, there was a decline in 
total number of monthly proactive calls for the control, which strengthens the argument for 
a positive social change in Lexington’s First District 
The last trendline to be examined is the number of arrests made from calls for 
service.  Dunbar saw a .17 slope increase in arrests per month whereas the Control and 
Displacement saw .02 and -.04 slope changes.  This number shows that when people from 
Dunbar call the LFUCPD, there is a greater likelihood that an arrest is going to happen.  
Though this is encouraging, it is still not conclusive evidence that the DNA is responsible 
for this change.  While it would make sense that the DNA is responsible for the change, a 
more complete study needs to be conducted which controls for more variables to make any 
definitive conclusions. 
Conclusion 
It seems that the establishment of the Dunbar Neighborhood Association may have 
been partly responsible for a change Dunbar crime from May 2003 - January 2006.  Since 
the establishment of the DNA, there have been statistically significant changes in seven of 
the eight categories that measure one specific form of community reactive and proactive 
forms of crime fighting.  Through regression analysis and trendline analysis, there is 
evidence that supports these changes did not happen by chance, but this evidence is not 
conclusive.  Regression models show that the number of arrests from calls for service made 
in Dunbar can be 80% explained by the number of specific calls made.  An examination of 
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trendlines gives evidence that a change in calling activity particular to the Lexington’s First 
District did happen, however, this analysis cannot conclusively state whether or not that 
change is due to the DNA.  When measuring possible for displacement effects of the DNA, 
evidence suggests that there may have actually been a positive effect in the Displacement 
Neighborhood.  Evidence thus far is consistent in finding that there is a clear causal 
relationship between establishment of the DNA and the change in crime.  However, this 
study needs to be furthered in the future to include 100 or greater observations, control for 
many more variables that could account for the change in proactive and reactive calling 
trends both pre and post establishment of the DNA.  
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